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ABSTRACT 
The paper underlines the progresses Hungary undertook during the pre-accession process and after the 
European  Union  membership  in  regional  economic  development.  Using  official  documents  of  the 
European Institutions, statistical data provided by Inforegio, Eurostat, the Hungarian National Institute of 
Statistics, FADN-DG Agriculture and AKI I’ve evaluated the impact of the European objectives and 
instruments for the cohesion (Structural funds and the Cohesion fund) on the convergence of the Country 
with the European parameters. The results obtained show a slow evidence of economic convergence but 
also the emergence and increase of internal divergence between ‘winning’ and ‘loosing’ counties, these 
last being prevalently agricultural, with problems of re-conversion increased by the effects of the post-
1989  legislative  provisions.  This  outcome  derives  party  from  the  lack  of  projecting  abilities  (and 
opportunism) of the Hungarian governments but it’s also linked to the often unsuitable guidelines and 
weak monitoring of the European Institutions. 




The European Union ‘East’ enlargement occurred on 1st May, 2004 (and its prosecution to Romania e 
Bulgaria  in  2007)  has  represented  a  great  challenge  for  both  the  European  institutions  and  the  new 
member States: in fact, this is the first time that ten Countries join the Union together, bringing about 500 
millions of new European citizens, doubling the hectares committed to agriculture and the labour force in 
that sector
1. 
The governments of eight of the candidate Countries, that were under the pervasive influence of Moscow 
till 1989, had to continue the reforms required by the transition process while trying to accomplish the 
requirements established by the EU Commission in the pre-accession document to get the membership. 
On the other side, the European institutions had to cope, in the guidelines proposed to the joining States, 
with ‘new’ problems linked to the different needs for intervention in those Countries due to their political, 
economic and social history of the second half of the XIX century
2. In order to help the future members to 
start a process of external and internal convergence (ex art. 158 ET) to narrow the development distance 
from the EU-15, and to reduce the differences of growth among their regions, the European Commission 
has  predisposed  and  co-financed  several  means  and  programs  of  intervention,  the  most  important  of 
which (in terms of financial assistance) are the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund
3. At the same 
time, the European Institutions had to reassure the old members that opposed the enlargement because of 
the fear of losing the community financing aids in the redistribution to the new-and poorer-incomers, 
specially the funds directed to the Common Agriculture Policy
4. 
The aim of this paper is to conduce a preliminary evaluation of the objectives and instruments offered by 
the EU to Hungary to undertake the problems emerged during the ongoing transition process, to fulfil the 
tasks of the Aquis Communitaire before the membership and to establish a convergence path. I’ve chosen 
Hungary because it has been considered
5 one of the ‘best performers’ among the transition Countries and 
the new European States.  
Interestingly, while the Country is showing a slow path of economic external convergence with the other 
EU member States, it’s experiencing a quite new phenomenon
6, the fast growth in internal divergence 
                                                 
1 Forgács, C.: The Challenge of Integrating CEEs Agriculture into the EU, in Studies in Agricultural Economics 2004. Num 
100. AKI, Budapest. 
2 Blanchard, O.: The Economics of transition in Eastern Europe. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1997 
3 ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_it.htm 
4 EC. Enlargement and Agriculture: Successfully integrating the new Member States into 
the CAP. Issues paper. Brussels, 30.1.2002 .SEC(2002) 95 final 
 
5 WB Report on transition Countries, 2002. 
6  During the past regime, regional inequality was already present in Hungary but a very lower lever.   3 
between the North Western region, together with the area of Budapest, and the Eastern border counties. 
These last ones, mostly dependent on agriculture, have been seriously and negatively affected by the 
reforming Laws adopted in the agricultural sector
7 that can be considered co-responsible for the increase 
in internal inequality. 
Contemporary I’ve examined the role played by the European institutions, especially by the European 
Commission as promoter of the objectives and instruments reserved to Hungary by the cohesion policy 
and  I’ve  proposed  a  preliminary  evaluation  of  them.  Probably,  establishing  a  reform  process  more 
focused on the knowledge of the internal reality of the Country, and considering the problems emerged by 
the pre-accession evaluation reports, a lot of the problems Hungary is experiencing nowadays wouldn’t 
appear  in  a  so  pronounced  way.  The  scarce  ability  of  the  succeeded  Hungarian  Governments  in  the 
preparations of the national development programmes (especially Ardop and NRDP
8), also because of the 
little experience in that, would have been restrained by a stricter control of the European Commission and 
its Committees. 
The evaluation of the efficiency of European funds in the new member States and their effects on the 
convergence is quite new both for the structure of the analysis proposed and for the implications found. In 
a moment of impasse for the European Union, dealing with internal institutional reforms and planning a 
new  enlargement  round  (Balkans  and  Turkey),  it’s  important  to  understand  the  whole  impact  of 
Community aids for new members to justify financial disbursements to the sceptical Countries and to 
learn from this experience to better face new possible joining.  
The structure of the paper is the following: I start with an overview of the current regional reality in 
Hungary, underlining its main features and problems (mainly explosion of internal disparity) emerged in 
the last years and examining the roles of the authorities responsible for that. In the second chapter I 
introduce the European instruments for the cohesion policy in Hungary, analyzing the contribution given 
by the Structural Funds and the Cohesion fund.  In the third one  I show the convergence/divergence 
effects  at  the  regional  level  while  the  last  chapter  is  focused  on  the  analysis  of  the  impact  of  the 
agricultural reforms on the structures of production in that sector, underlining how the great division of 
land hasn’t increased the quality of production neither the incomes of those living of agriculture. 
 
1. AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL REALITY IN HUNGARY. 
 
Thanks to its central position between Europe and the Balkans, to the presence of the river Danube and 
for its fundamental historical role in the European facts
9, Hungary represents an important gathering point 
between  Eastern  and  Western  Europe.  Nowadays  the  Country  has  circa  10  millions  inhabitants
10,  it 
extends for 93.029 km², 96% of which considered mainly agricultural following OCSE classification. Its 
main regions, classified followed the NUTS 2 parameters, are seven: Central Transdanubian, Western 
Transdanubian, Southern Transdanubian, Central Hungary, Northern Hungary, Northern Great Plain and 
Southern Great Plain. Since 1998, as required for acquiring the membership, Hungary has introduced a 
regional and sub-regional territorial classification, counting also 19 counties (NUTS 3 level) other than 
the capital, Budapest, 168 sub-regions (LAU 1) and 3.145 among cities, towns and villages (LAU 2), all 
of them with their own independent local governments
11. The division in counties dates back to the XI 
century, as a difference from the most of the other new member States where the division is recent and 
often introduced just after the membership agreements (in Hungary, already before the World War I there 
were 70 counties). 
It’s important to underline that, as a consequence of the decentralization process started after the system 
change, the local governments are now independent from the Central one and there’s no hierarchy among 
them: their duties and rights are established by the Self Government Act. By the way, decentralizing 
                                                 
7 I refer here to the Restitution Legislation in four Acts (1991) and the Law on Cooperatives in two Acts (1992). 
8 The official documents are often missing in quality and in the reliability of the Statistical data proposed. 
9 Bianchini, S., Privitera, F., Guida ai Paesi dell'Europa Centrale, Orientale e Balcanica. Annuario politico-economico, 
edizione 2003, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2004. 
10 The data refers at 2005. Source: Inforegio. 
11 http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/regportraits/info/data/en   4 
governmental powers hasn’t avoided the coming out of efficiency and coordination problems, especially 
in dealing with the application of regional policies. 
 
1.I The Players of Regional Policy. 
 
In order to follow the requirements in Chapter 21 of the Aquis Communitaire and to become able to 
achieve and manage the Community funds for the cohesion policy, Hungary has established a renewed 
institutional and administrative system. By the way, regional entities has just played a limited role in the 
decision making regarding regional policy because of the lack in managing abilities and because of the 
initial  instability  (due  to  the  opposition  of  powers  among  counties).  So,  the  control  on  the  regional 
development programs remained to the Central Government, specifically to the Ministry for Environment 
and Regional Policy, created in 1990 and initially endowed with few powers because of the high number 
of tasks, the scarcity of resources and the sharing of responsibility with the Minister of Interiors (who 
planned the disbursements)
12. Moreover, summing that to the lack of a strategically direction of the tasks, 
we can easily understand why that Ministry started to fully work just at the end of the ‘90s.  
In 1996, the competencies for the Ministry about regional and spatial development were indicated by the 
Regional  Development  Act.  After  the  1998  elections,  the  new  Ministry  for  Agricultural  and  Rural 
Development  (MoARD)  has  been  responsible  for  regional  policy,  under  the  supervision  of  the 
Independent Smallholder's Party
13 (Független Kisgazdapárt) that unofficially contributed to determines 
the policy provisions adopted. This new Ministry gathers the governmental competencies about regional 
policy and the previously detached Unity for the EU Integration, dealing with the management of EU co-
financed  programs  (as  PHARE).  Other  than  MoARD,  other  Ministries  take  part  in  regional  policy 
because this one has been traditionally sub ordered to part interests, as it also happens now. Even thou the 
strengths  to  enforce  the  ministerial  cooperation,  a  slow  path  of  coordination  emerges  in  regional 
development  activities  and  among  these  and  other  initiatives  coming  from  single  ministries,  with  a 
limited spatial impact. This element represents a strong obstacle to the programming and to the enforcing 
of the interventions on regional scales, due to the fact that there are several offices with related tasks. 
 
2. THE EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS FOR THE COHESION IN HUNGARY. 
 
In the program of Agenda 2000 are established the interventions supporting the cohesion policy in the 
former candidate Countries for the programming period 2000-2006: we principally refer to the cohesion 
fund and to the structural funds which represent a disbursement, for Hungary and for the other CEEs, 
equal to the 4% of GDP
14 in the EU-25. With these instruments the EU pursues the objectives of regional 
policy: as in the Title XVII- Economic and Social Cohesion- of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community and in its art. 158, in order to promote the harmonic development, the Community works 
to  design  and  actuate  actions  for  the  strengthening  of  the  economic  and  social  cohesion  among  its 
members.  Particularly,  the  Community  aims  to  diminish  disparity  in  different  regional  development 
levels, the backwardness of the disadvantaged and peripheral ones and the islands, including rural areas. 
For this reason, more than 2/3 of the financial endowment for structural funds (more than 135 billion 
euro) was designated to the backward areas classified as Objective 1
15 because their per capita GDP 
(p.p.p.) is less than 75% of the European average
16. In order to diminish regional disparities doubled after 
the 2004 enlargement
17(the EU average income decreases of circa 12.5%, population living in backward 
regions increases from 20% till 25%) and pursuing the convergence inside the EU, according to the 
                                                 
12 Bacthler et al., 1999. 
13 A minor party in the right-wing coalition. 
14 Viesti-Prota, Le Politiche Regionali dell’Unione Europea. Il Mulino. Bologna. 2005. 
15 With the programming period 2007-2013, the Objectives remain three but they get a new denomination: Convergence, 
Regional Competitiveness and Employment, European Territorial Cooperation. 
16 European Union web site, section regarding regional policy management. 
17 EC Third Relation on Social and Economic Cohesion. Brussel, 17/05/2005.   5 
criteria  established  in  the  Council  Regulation  No  1260/1999  regarding  Structural  Funds,  Hungary  is 
completely shifted in Objective 1 for the period 2004-2006
18. 
In fact, the Country presents some indicators placed in the red zone: 
1.  Low investments level; 
2.  unemployment rate higher than the average; 
3.  lack of services for enterprises and citizens; 
4.  poor basic infrastructures. 
Structural Funds finance development programs endowed with an own balance and presented by the 
Government  of  the  State  interested  in  the  eligibility  for  the  financial  assistance  in  a  programming 
document covering several years. This plan must be implemented by the interested Government just after 
the EC approval. Hungary has presented in 2003 its National Development Plan for the Implementation 
of the EU Structural Funds
19 in which also the structural funds providing for a partial covering of the 
expenses are presented: 
·  European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). 
·  European Social Fund. 
·  European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). 
·  Financial Instruments for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). 
During the drafting of that document, national and regional authorities are assisted by the EC which, in 
the ‘Further Indicative Guidelines for the Candidate Countries’
20 (EC Communicate 2003), indicates the 
guidelines that should consider the specificity of every involved Country. Priorities are related to the 
problems each State is facing and to the commitments undertaken under the Aquis Communitaire
21. 
In the first programming period 2004-2006, Hungary could benefit from Structural funds and Cohesion 
fund disbursed on the basis of the Hungarian National Development Plan which identifies the priority 
objectives for development and in which the modalities of employment of the European funds are 
explained. In that document, the Hungarian Government presents ‘the reduction of the existing disparity 
between the p.c. GDP of the Country and the European average’ (external convergence) as the long term 
objective; then, it analyzes strengths and weaknesses of the Hungarian economical system with a SWOT 
analysis. The scope is the identification and the subsequent correction of the causes generating disparity 
at the national level. In the HNDP, four objectives are considered as priority: 
1. Increase in the competitiveness of the productive sector. 
2. Rise of employment and human resources development. 
3. Infrastructural improvement and environmental safeguard. 
4. Strengthening of regional and local potentials. 
These points should be realized by five Operative Programs which identify the specific actions and 
establish the economic private/public operators competing with own projects for the achievement of the 
Community funds. Every OP is under the responsibility of a managing authority which cooperates with 
the Plan Unit, assuring the coherence among actions started, key objective and strategies highlighted. 
MoARD is responsible for the OP Agriculture and Rural Development. 
Other programs among Community Actions are also implemented with the financial assistance of the 
Structural Funds, namely INTERREG (III A, IIIB, IIIC) about trans-national cooperation and EQUAL, 
for the establishment of partnerships (against gender discrimination on the workplace). 
                                                 
18 EC Document, Financial Outlook 2007-2013. 
19 ‘Hungarian National Development Plan for the Implementation of the EU Structural 
Funds – Single Programming Document 2004-2006’. 
20 Commission Communication of 12 March 2003 - Further indicative guidelines for the candidate countries. 
21 They are also in accordance with the guidelines of the EU Community Strategy 2007-2013.   6 
Finally, the Cohesion Fund provides disbursements to Hungary for infrastructural projects regarding 
environment protection (potable water, waste..) and transports (motorway, airports..). 
It’s important to underline that the EU acts as a co-financer for the projects: the entitled Country has also 
to take part in the financing (with lower quotas). 
  
Tab. 2.I Community funds 2007-2013 for Hungary. 







  Cohesion 
Fund 






   
EU-27 
Financing 




8.642  14.248    2.031    386  25.307 
Data in millions euro, at current prices. 
Source: own elaboration on Inforegio data 2006. 
 
3. FIRST POSTIVE RESULTS AND BLACKLASHES IN THE ANSWER TO THE 
INCREASING INEQUALITY. 
 
With the beginning of the transition process and the explosion of socio-economical problems linked to 
that, Hungary, as the other CEEs
22, posed the basis for the development of a regional-European like-
policy to solve these new problems and to open the way for the European membership. Some internal 
differences already existed in the previous planned economy but they drastically increased during the 
reform  period,  before  and  (still)  after  the  joining  the  EU.  In  fact,  even  thou  the  Community  funds 
disposed under the cohesion policy for Hungary, sooner as a candidate Country and later as an effective 
member,  the  level  of  inequality
23  among  the  Hungarian  regions  has  continuously  augmented.  The 
explosion  of  internal  divergence  accompanied  the  introduction  of  a  market  economy,  while  in  the 
socialist period it was more limited because the rapid industrialization gave impulse to urbanization also 
in the less developed regions. As a consequence, between 1948 and 1989 the data showed an increase in 
economic convergence
24. 
In the transition years, instead, two factors appeared in the Hungarian regional policy as in the other 
CEEs: the clear East-West demarcation; the dominant role of the Capital town and its border areas for 
the development of the Country. It’s possible to identify a winner and two losers, whereas the Capital and 
the main cities belong to he first group while rural areas and Eastern peripheries to the second one
25. The 
increase  in  internal  divergence  in  the  rate  of  development  showed  above  goes  hand  to  hand  with  a 
pronounced (at least till 2005) external convergence (catching up) with the EU-27 average level of p.c. 
GPD. In fact, after a structural fall in GDP around 40%
26 between 1989 and 1995, a new and quite steady 
growth  trend  imposed  so  that,  in  2001,  Hungary  could  exceed  the  1989  one.  Few  months  after  the 
European membership, Hungarian p.c. GDP was circa 60% lower than the EU-25 average, comparable to 
the poorest regions as Iperios (Greece) or Açores in Portugal. Even if the growth in GDP has decelerated 
                                                 
22 Central and Eastern European Countries. 
23 European Commission, 2001a. 
24 By the way, we must always take care about the affordability of the data proposed. 
25 Iara and Traistaru, 2003. 
26 In comparison with the pre-transition level.   7 
in  2006
27  (+3.5%)  and  in  2007
28  (+2.6%),  in  the  current  programming  period  the  region  in  which 
Budapest is located (Közép-Magyarország) is classified as phasing in
29; by the way, we must keep in 
mind  that  the  joining  of  Romania  and  Bulgaria  in  2007  has  generated  a  statistical  effect  (due  to  a 
comparative numerical improvement, greater than the real one). 
This slow but constant approach to the Community economic levels demonstrates, from on side, that the 
European disbursements contributed to start a growth process in Hungary but they weren’t able to oppose 
and reverse the impressing increase in internal disparity, in contrast with the prescriptions and objectives 
established by the EU cohesion policy. The problems emerged in the application of its instruments in 
Hungary (as in the other CEEs) can also be read as a trade off between equity and efficiency
30. In order to 
highlight the different aspects of this situation we can compare two examples among better off and worse 
off regions during the ongoing approaching to the EU parameters. 
 
3.I The Winning and the Loosing Areas.  
 
Following this division, in the first grouping we find Budapest, able to lead the bordering area in the way 
of development. This event was predictable because already in the ex satellites Countries, as in the ex 
Soviet  bloc,  the  Capital  town  had  a  leading  economical  and  political  role.  An  interesting  news  is 
represented by  the  Gyır and Sopron counties, located  at the North-West border: these  areas  got the 
second  position  (after  Budapest)  according  to  the  economical  performance,  thanks  to  a  revitalized 
economic growth along the Austrian border, to the fast transformation of the main cities (Sopron, Gyır) 
and to the improvement of tourism facilities around the lake Balaton. 
The reason of the success of these areas remains in the ability to develop the services sector and to 
reorganize production in the manufacturing sector, reallocating its workers and attracting FDI
31: these 
counties are characterized by the growth of new enterprises in which coagulated a considerable amount of 
FDI (already in the middle of the ’90, the half of all the foreign direct investment in Hungary reached 
Budapest) and contributed to determine a lower level of unemployment. This could happen because of the 
good endowment in infrastructures (the M1 motorway as ex.) which encouraged the delocalization of 
several international joint ventures
32. While Budapest attracted mainly activities linked to the tertiary 
sector  and  finance,  the  Gyır-Moson-Sopron  and  Vas  counties  had  become  specialized  centres  for 
industrial  production.
33  Moreover,  since  the  years  preceding  2000,  this  advantage  has  continuously 
increased following up the positive uninterrupted growth trend: here more than 70% of employed works 
in the tertiary and 50% of people dealing with R&D in Hungary
34finds place, thanks also to the numerous 
Universities located in the Capital. 
Budapest is situated in the region (NUTS 2 classification) called Közép-Magyarország, the most similar 
to the EU-15 regarding the current characteristics and economic and demographic growth trend. In this 
Region, 17% of the Hungarian population lives (1.179.000 people), in constant decline comparing to the 
last years. To understand the relevance of this data we can consider that Debrecen, the second biggest 
city, has 205.000 inhabitants and just other seven cities go over 100.000
35. The Capital town is also the 
main  immigration  centre,  it  has  174  of  all  the  employed,  with  a  relatively  higher  education  level 
(especially for women). 
Instead Gyır, in the Nyugat-Dunántúl region, is in the middle between Wien and Budapest and it’s linked 
to these cities through an excellent transport network. It can offer foreign investors (Audi and Philips as 
ex.) workers with good technical endowment and motivation: this is an important element, not easily 
                                                 
27 EBDR transition report 2006. 
28Prevision of the Economist Intelligence Unit, end of 2006. 
29 Phasing in regions are the ones (NUTS 2 level)  previously covered by Objective 1 and presenting a GDP superior to the 
EU-15 average. They are eligible till 2013 for decreasing  support. 
30 Lackenbauer J., 2004. 
31 Foreign Direct Investments. 
32 Horváth, 2002. 
33 Rechnitzer, 2000. 
34 Bachtler et al., 1999. 
35 The data refer to 2004. Encyclopaedia Britannica.   8 
available in all the areas of the Country due to the problems of retraining noticed in some regions and for 
some kinds of jobs. 
The productive evolution in both areas reflects on the wages: in Budapest the medium wage is 34% 
higher than the national average, specially in the services and in the financial sector; in the Gyır-Moson-
Sopron and Vas counties the average wage was just a bit lower than the precedent one already in 2001, 
with peaks in the secondary sector because of the productive characteristics
36. 
On the other side we find rural areas, regions once characterized by the presence of heavy industry and 
Eastern peripheries which present a worse socio-economical situation, due to the problems of industrial 
re-conversion  and  workers’  retraining  (in  the  three  Eastern  Counties  35%  of  unemployed  and  less 
qualified workers live). Észak-Magyarország, Észak-Alföld and Dél-Alföld continue the decline started 
with the restructuring of the past productive system that in these areas was equivalent to the destruction of 
the old unproductive power and chemical plants, to the split of cooperatives and the discharge of labour 
force  which  hasn’t  been  able  to  adequate  to  the  requirements  of  the  new  organizations.  The  main 
weaknesses, contributing to enhance the centre-periphery
37 dichotomy, can be briefly listed: problems of 
re-conversion of the production; the still remaining heavy industry from the past system; the prevalence 
of small towns and villages; the presence of traditional
38 and mono-farming dating back the socialist time. 
This  spatial  partition  follows  the  historical  pre-socialist  one  where  the  dividing  line  consisted  in  the 
Danube River: till the World War II, Western regions showed a development path similar to the Western 
European  ones  while  in  the  Eastern  areas  agriculture  was  the  leading  factor  inside  the  economical 
structure. These last ones suffered also for the worsening of the economical situation in Ukraine, Romania 
and ex-Yugoslavia with which they maintained (before 1989) important commercial exchanges and from 
which they were dependent for the import of some basic goods. As COMECON finished in 1991, the 
Northern and Southern Great Plain weren’t able to find other markets for the exchange of their products 
and the membership in the EU hasn’t recovered the import-export of the precedent era. Moreover, mainly 
agricultural  areas  aggrieved  by  problems  of  re-conversion  from  extensive  mono-farming  (that 
endangered  also  the  quality  of  the  land)  to  individual  farming  and  dealing  with  restructuring  of 
cooperatives suffer now from the concurrency of cheaper products coming from Bulgaria and Romania. 
At  the  end,  these  areas  result  to  be  less  attractive  for  FDI  because  of  the  lack  of  transport 
infrastructures and services for enterprises. Then, along the Eastern and Southern borders (as in Bác-
Kiskun county) illegal economic activities and trafficking have spread, discouraging investments.  
In the Northern Eastern Counties the privatization process started too late (or it didn’t started in the 
facts)
39consisting of few big foreign investors and ex firms managers which bought out the firms without 
bringing around improvements to revitalize the production structures. The Hajdú Bihar county can be 
taken as an example: it has presented a constant average on the regional value added (circa 4%) while 
since 1995 Észak-Alföld, the region in which Hajdú Bihar is, has continuously increased the produced 
added value. The highest percentage on AV is detained by the primary sector which still in 2001 touched 
9.1%, the highest level among the Hungarian counties
40. These data reflect the importance of agriculture 
in this county (and region) and show how the legislative provisions adopted in that sector at the beginning 
of the ’90 negatively affected and party determined the current delay in development. I refer here to the 
Restitution Acts (1991), meant to give back the land to the ones who hold it before 1939 and before the 
first Socialist Government
41, and to the Law on Cooperatives (1992). The following division of land in 
very small (and often not contiguous) plots didn’t help to solve the problems inherited from the past 
system, mainly linked to the use of pesticides and pre-treated seeds. 
These element negatively influenced occupation: since 1995, the employment rate hasn’t increased in the 
secondary or in the tertiary sector, while in the primary one a slow but constant fall in employment has 
been registered. The average wage is around 20% lower than the national average with a negative pick in 
the tertiary sector. It’s no surprise that the unemployment level in Hindu Bihar county is higher than the 
                                                 
36 Inforegio 2004. 
37 Frank, 2000. 
38 Bachtler et al., 1999. 
39 Rechnitzer, 2000. 
40 Even if the agricultural value declined: in 1995 it represented 12.5% on AV. 
41 The properties taken after the Law against Hebrews in 1939 and after the first Socialist Government got the power in 
Hungary.   9 
national average and linked to the problems of transition; moreover, whereas at the beginning the 
phenomenon interested mainly workers with low skills, living in villages or next to the State borders, now 
more than 1/3 of unemployed people in the County are people with an intermediate educational level, 
55% of which men (but we must underline that the female participation is generally low). Everywhere the 
demand for work exceeds the supply and there’s no matching between abilities offered and required in 
all the sectors.  
In order to underline the relevance of the increase of internal inequality in Hungary we can compare the 
evolution of p.c. GDP level in the Hungarian richest and poorest regions with the one related to Eastern 
and Western division in Germany, whereas Germany has been the Country showing the highest internal 
income disparity, since the Reunification, in Europe. Surprisingly, while the data about the variation 
between Hamburg and Esau is negative, the one related to the Hungarian case is strongly positive. 
 
Tab. 3.I.1 Income disparity between richest and poorest regions, in Hungary and Germany. 










(2)/(3)  of 
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2.02  2.40  2.45  +21% 
Germany  Hamburg  Dessau  2.88  2.83  2.60  -9.7% 
 
Tab. 3.I.2 Regional GDP 1999-2003. 
p.c. GDP as %UE-25 average  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Közép-Magyarország  78.7  81.8  88.2  95.0  94.9 
Észak-Alföld  33.4  33.6  37.1  37.5  39 
Nyugat-Dunántúl  59.9  60.4  59.1  60.4  64.5 
 
Tab. 3.I.3 Regional employment level 1999-2003. 
Regional employment (15-64) as % on the total  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Közép-Magyarország  60.6  60.9  61.7  62.9  63.3 
Észak-Alföld  49.5  49.3  51.6  50.4  50.0 
Nyugat-Dunántúl  63.1  63.7  61.9  61.4  62.0 
Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data. 
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3.II The Incidence of Agricultural Reforms on Rural Development. 
 
As  mentioned  before,  the  agricultural  reforms  introduced  in  the  early  ’90  had  a  remarkable  role  in 
determining the persisting disadvantage of mainly agricultural eastern counties. The long term purpose of 
the legislative provisions, as the governments succeeded in these transition years affirmed, should have 
been the introduction of an efficient, private and market-oriented, agricultural system. The supposed 
methods didn’t differ so much from the ones established in the other CEEs, except for the degree of 
application (higher because of the role detained here by agriculture): introduction of private property and 
opening to the market forces. The new agricultural legislation should deal with these elements and also 
with  the  requirements  (regarding  productive  methods,  marketing  and  the  quality  levels  of  products) 
disposed  by  EU  for  the  full  integration  in  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy.  Whereas  the  original 
objective  declared  by  the  first  right  wing  government  was  the  ‘unification  of  the  principles  of  land 
property  and  land  use’
42,  this  had  been  in  a  larger  extent  disobeyed  in  favour  of  the  principle  of 
restitution. The Independent Smallholder's Party, defending its positions also with obstructionism actions 
in  the  Parliament
43,  could  impose  a  legislative  reform  in  favour  of  individual  farmers  resulting 
counterproductive in terms of production and quality increase. The negative impact of this provision has 
been competed by the Hungarian governments’ scarce ability to implement policy programs, to oppose 
the historical agricultural lobbies and to earmark the funds got for clear objectives. The following left 
wing  government  has  continued  to  increase  income  subsidies  for  farmers,  without  changing  those 
blocking laws. 
The Restitution Legislation (in four Acts) established a partial, indirect and quite flexible
44 process of 
restitution
45, through a system of land auctions in which all the people expropriated could take part after 
having  received  the  vouchers  necessary  to  obtain  the  lost  properties.  In  1992,  a  National  Office  for 
restitutions
46 was created with the task of collecting the demands and to inform collective farms they had 
to  provide  for  a  corporate  fund  for  the  compensation
47.  We  refer  to  the  Hungarian  agricultural  land 
privatisation as a naming process because the normative attributed a value to the assets for which were 
considered eligible coop and ex coop members, their families and employees which presented a validate 
request
48. Every local authority sets a Committee for super visioning the auctions and to assure the land 
was really  worked
49. Auctions didn’t take place if the participants could agree in a price; moreover, 
preference was given to the attendants who used all the vouchers together and to people reclaiming land 
for a value superior to 100.000 florins.  
In 1992, a new Law on Co-operatives was passed, consisting of two Acts: ‘one specifying how co-
operatives should be transformed, the other one specifying how genuine co-operatives should behave’
50. 
The law aimed to extend at the maximum level the number of people who could reclaim land from 
collective farms, propelling to the dismantling of the coop. Moreover, at the end of the restructuring and 
reallocation process, coops have been covered by the legislation on bankruptcy, as for private firms. 
The results of these measures can be briefly exposed: 
1.  the four Acts on Restitution created other 1.0-1.1 million of new land owners having an average of 
1.7-1.8 hectares p.c., generating a high fragmentation level, negative in respect with the increase 
in productivity, quality levels of products and technical efficiency.  
                                                 
42 Szőcs, Széles, 2004. 
43 And favoured by the low opposition of the other Parties. 
44 To manage reclaims due to the fact that the restitution year has been anticipated to 1939. 
45 Which went together with agricultural privatisation in Hungary. 
46 Orszagos Karpotlasi és Karrendezési Hivatal-OKKH. 
47 Szőcs, Széles, 2004. 
48 Swain, N.: The Legislative Framework for Agricultural Transition in Hungary. Working paper n.25, Rural Transition Series. 
University of Liverpool. 1994. 
49 When the Committee discovered the land wasn’t cultivated, a new temporary farmer had to be found. 
50 Swain, N., cfr. Supra.   11 
2.  The number of cooperatives decreased after the first uncertain years
51 and the transformed ones 
had to face with the increase of competitiveness due to the market economy, with the decrease in 
subsidies and with the dismantling in favour of individual farmers. 
After  fifteen  years,  now  the  half  of  productive  lands  is  used  by  coop,  generating  46%  of  the  gross 
margin
52. Among EU-27, Hungarian coop show the widest cultivated area but they have a very low 
endowment in capitals in comparison to the European ones. 
On the other side, in 1998 just 1% of land was cultivated by small private farms, showing that, after an 
initial return to the land, small owners preferred to rent o sell it since the half of the ‘90s. 
 
Tab. 3.II.1 Land distribution according to the property (in thousand hectares). 
Name  1990  1993  1995  1999  2001 
Cooperatives  5147.1  3931.3  2208  1494.5  855 
Economical Organizations  8014.4  7037.3  4801.2  4114  3640.1 
Individual Farmers  1288.8  2204.6  4034.7  4689  4195.6 
Partnership  2867.3  3106  2593.2  2619.5  2785 
Others  ...  6.1  467.1  500.1  1467.7 
Total  9303.2  9303  9303  9303.1  9303 
Source: Szőcs, Széles, 2004. 
 
4. THE LIMITS OF THE COMMUNITY STRATEGY FOR REGIONAL POLICY. 
 
One  year  after  the  conclusion  of  the  first  programming  period,  we  can  affirm  Hungary  has  reached 
important goals in socio-economical development. Concretely, several projects, specially the ones linked 
to  INTERREG  for  trans-border  cooperation  and  for  the  sustain  of  SMEs  have  realized.  Also  the 
management of the tenders and financings regarding rural development has improved so that individual 
farmers can face now fewer bureaucratic obstacles for applying Community aids. Moreover, as explained 
before, Hungary could move near the EU-27 average level of p.c. GDP, approaching the convergence 
objective. By the way, a lot of rubs appeared along the development path and the explosion of regional 
disparity could be assessed as a clear example. So, in the prevision of future EU enlargements
53, it’s 
important to understand whether some problems could be avoided carrying on a different policy: if some 
errors have been committed, could they be prevented in the future? 
To answer this question I’ve examined EC documents published before the Hungarian membership in 
2004: in the thousands of collected pages evaluating the path of development reached by the Country 
during  the  pre-accession  years,  lots  of  deficiencies  in  the  application  of  the  requirements  for  the  31 
Chapters composing the Aquis emerge. As in 1999
54 the EC reported Hungary satisfied the Copenhagen 
Criteria, pointing out the only areas in delay regarded the discriminatory situation of Roma people and 
the fight against corruption, four years later
55 the same EC had a less optimistic vision. Considering the 
agricultural sector and the statistical adaptation, the outcomes achieved often don’t conform to the general 
                                                 
51 At the beginning of the reform process just 7-10% of the members decided to leave the coop. 
52 Hungarian Farm Structure Survey, 2003. 
53 For the realization of which it’s desiderable to learn from these errors, in order to prevent serious problems and to save 
community money. 
54 CE 1999 Regular Report of the Commission on Hungary’s Progress toward Accession.  
55 CE Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Hungary’s Preparation for Membership. 2003.   12 
evaluation: in 1999, in fact, the EC noticed that, even thou the introduction of a law about the agricultural 
census, the problem of statistical adjustment was postponed in the evaluation proposed by the Committee 
of expert, the same that in 2003 underlined that ‘Hungary registered just limited progresses in arranging 
the progressive introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy’. In 2000 the EC recorder that ‘the slow 
path in which mechanisms interesting the common market organizations and structures linked to the 
European Orientation and Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EOAGF) are adopted prevents the strengthening 
of the managing abilities’ while in 2002, ‘Hungary continues to progress slowly but the Country must 
embrace further efforts in order to establish an integrated control and management system for SAPARD. 
Moreover, delays are registered regarding the institution of a paying authority’. At the end, in the 2003 
Report in which the EC exposes the general adherence level to the chapters of the Aquis reached before 
the membership, it underlines again the importance of a punctual and effective application of the binding 
laws regarding agriculture from the managing authority. 
Regarding the evaluation of the fulfilment of the 21st Chapter
56 (regional policy), the EC highlighted that 
the Country 
1.  has introduced the territorial division following the NUTS classification; 
2.  has adjusted the legislative framework (the ability of assure a multi annual budget planning) but 
the secondary legislation and some basic amendments to the Public Finance Act were missing. 
Then, to allow the full exploitation of its eligibility for structural funds since 01/01/2004, the 
Government had to fulfil the commitments regarding state aids and public supports; 
3.  has introduced the main institutions for the preparation and implementation of structural funds and 
cohesion fund but the designation of intermediate organs and implementing structures has to be 
completed (mainly for the control, authorization and execution of the payments to the final 
beneficiaries). 
4.  Programming documents- specially the Development Plan and the OP-have been presented even if 
the final evaluation wasn’t finished. Consequently, Hungary still had to present OP and DP two 
months after the membership whereas delays in the monitoring system were also found.  
After  Hungary  became  a  member  of  the  EU  in  2004,  the  EC,  in  the  ‘16th  Annual  Report  on  the 
implementation of the Structural Funds’
57 analyzes the further challenges Hungary has to face: first of all 
improving  the  quality  of  national  projects;  guarantying  an  proper  and  equilibrate  geographical 
covering; solving administrative lacks in the area of Budapest as in the more disadvantaged counties 
(mainly ameliorating professional training). It was also underlined that: 
·  Two months before the arrival of the Community financings for the period 2004-2006, 
institutional structures for the implementation of structural and cohesion funds haven’t 
been designed yet.  
·  More attention was required to achieve an efficient inter-ministerial coordination and for 
the functioning of the Paying Authority.  





2004 and 2007 have been characterized by a fundamental event for the future of the EU: the enlargement 
to ten Eastern European Countries. This step has led to the modification of the European cohesion policy, 
mainly  regarding  the  programs  (43  more,  specially  for  underdeveloped  regions)  and  the  Community 
instruments, whereas the financial allocations for the programming years 2004-2006 reached 24 billion 
                                                 
56 In this Chapter are outlined the rules for the designation, the approval and the implementation of structural funds and 
cohesion fund. Programs are negotiated with and approved by the EC but their implementation is a task of the Government. 
57 16
th Annual Report on the implementation of the Structural Funds. 2004. 
58  Charter 21, Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Hungary’s Preparation for Membership. 2003.   13 
euros (at current prices)
59. The increase in financial resources hasn’t always comported the development 
of the beneficing Countries and Hungary can be taken as a good example of that. Despite the conspicuous 
disbursement  received,  the  new  member  State  hasn’t  been  able  to  start  an  equilibrated  process  of 
development among its regions: as in other CEEs, the Country shows a process of external convergence 
with  the  average  UE-27  income  level  but,  at  the  same  time,  it  experiences  an  explosion  in  internal 
divergence.  North-western  regions  and  the  Capital  town  could  benefit  of  the  impulse  given  by  the 
Community aids in a greater extent than the Eastern peripheries. This bi-frontal result can be considered 
as the consequence of the lack in managing and planning abilities of the Hungarian governments but it 
can be also derived by the scarce supervision of the European institutions (in primis the EC), both in the 
Hungarian process of approaching the EU and in the post-membership.  
Whereas the deficiencies ascribed to the Hungarian governments could be easily predicted, the European 
institutions  that  should  address  and  guide  the  Country  before  the  joining  have  committed  numerous 
‘oversights’ during their evaluations. If we can discuss about the accuracy with which the Hungarian 
membership  has  been  disposed,  looking  at  the  institutional  and  organizational  lacks  exposed  in  the 
previous pages, there is no doubt about the underestimation of the increasing internal inequality and about 
the acceptation of the regional development programs presented by the new member State. In the end, the 
EC  approval  of  the  legislative  agricultural  reforms  regarding  the  restitution  of  the  land  and  the 
restructuring of Cooperatives hasn’t encouraged productive and quality increases in agriculture. 
The picture emerged from this analysis shows an uncertain future not only for the results of the reforms 
enacted  in  Hungary  but  also  for  the  evolution  of  the  EU,  facing  the  consequences  of  the  new 
memberships and probable next enlargements to the Balkans and to Turkey (with the following required 
adjustments of the community policy). If the EU wants to continue its ‘growth’ successfully, promoting 
the principles of the cohesion policy among its members without facing continuously with the ex-post 
‘unexpected’ problems, it should rethink the policy prescriptions for the candidate Countries. This would 
prevent the appear of contrasting results from the utilization of the Community funds: weak signals of 
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